Abstract Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective, it articulates a brief yet comprehensive genealogy of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in Greece, exploring their discursive strategies. Moving on, it identifies the main characteristics this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden sociopolitical field, highlighting the implications for a contemporary understanding of cleavages, with potentially broader implications.
Introduction
Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep socio-economic dislocation, leading to a severe crisis of representation and, finally, triggering new populist mobilisations as well as anti-populist reactions. This, however, was not the first time the populism/anti-populism divide became a key factor in the Greek post-authoritarian context. It was rather the reactivation of a salient feature that has defined the Greek public sphere since the early 1980s, when the populist party PASOK established its long hegemony. Yet, while aspects of this antagonistic dialectic between populism and anti-populism have been occasionally discussed in the relevant literature (Lyrintzis, 2005; Pantazopoulos, 2011; Sevastakis and Stavrakakis, 2012) , its real nature and implications have not been properly investigated.
Political scientists such as Nikiforos Diamandouros and Takis Pappas may have
captured the importance of antagonism and polarisation -discussed by Diamandouros in terms of a pervasive 'dualism' -as well as the central role of populism in this division (Diamandouros, 1994; Pappas, 2014) ; however, over-identifying with a perspective premised on essentialised, euro-centric theories of modernisation and thus a priori accepting a one-sided, pejorative understanding of populism, they have failed to offer a truly reflexive theorisation of the populism/anti-populism frontier and of the role of both sides involved in constructing and reproducing it.
The present article is envisaged as responding to this gap in the literature. In order to do this, the 'important notion of anti-populism' which 'has never really been studied or thematized as such ' (Ostiguy, 2009: 23-4) needs to be brought to the fore. Hence, highlighting the need to study populism and anti-populism together and focusing on their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective (Stavrakakis et al., 2017) , we Published in European Political Science, First Online: 22 January 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0138-3 3 will articulate a brief yet comprehensive analysis of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in contemporary Greece. In doing so, we reconstruct the development of the populist/anti-populist divide in Greece's post-authoritarian history, up until the recent crisis. Moving on, we identify the main characteristics (actors and strategies) this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden public sphere. We conclude by drawing some implications for the broader area of populism research in Southern Europe and beyond.
Conceptual Clarifications: Populism, Crisis, Mediation, Anti-Populism
In line with an evolving consensus between discursive and ideational definitions (see Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014) , we understand populism as a specific type of discourse which claims to express popular interests and to represent associated identities and demands (the 'will of the people') against an 'establishment' or elite, which is seen as undermining these and forestalling their satisfaction (see also Salgado and Stavrakakis, 2018) . Accordingly, populist discursive representations typically articulate a polarised antagonistic framing of the socio-political field, in a bid to inspire and mobilise frustrated/excluded social groups.
The latter (named as 'the people,' the 'underdog,' 'the many,' etc.) are called to establish horizontal links (what Ernesto Laclau calls 'chains of equivalence'), which will enable them to effectively challenge the established power structure and to influence decision-making (Laclau, 2005) . But how and when does populism emerge and/or succeed?
Researchers have often stressed the central role that some notion of 'crisis' plays in the manifestation of populist phenomena (Laclau, 1977: 175; Taggart, 2000: 2, 4-5, 93-94, 117; Roberts, 2015) . Benjamin Moffitt has recently placed emphasis on the ' (2015: 190) . Connecting both perspectives, Ernesto Laclau has highlighted the dual character of social dislocation: a dislocation, the failure of an established system of representation to effectively incorporate an 'anomaly' (or 'failure') is presupposed as a triggering mechanism for new populist (and other) discursive constructions performatively narrating its characteristics and offering distinct political solutions (1990: 63, 65) . In this approach, the real of the crisis (what others would call the 'objective' dimension of the crisis) becomes accessible through mediation, through its performative construction and representation by populist discourse (Stavrakakis et al., 2017) .
Hence, according to an Essex School perspective, it is through the performative articulation of such narratives that 'discourses' are constituted and identities assumed.
In addition, this process invariably involves 'the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between "insiders" and "outsiders" ' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4) . In this sense, discursive articulation relies on blame attribution, on the affective investment of difference through the identification of 'constitutive outsides', thus sustaining binary oppositions such as us/them (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 22) . Similar conclusions can be drawn from a framing perspective.
In order to render our experience meaningful, framing efforts are supposed to identify problems, diagnose causes and assign blame (Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford 1988; Kuypers, 2010) : 'framing processes also allow for the definition of the self and the opponents, in short for the definition of the "us" and the "them" category' (Caiani and Della Porta 2011: 182) . it. Hence our hypothesis is that it is not just populists who take advantage of a crisis situation in a bid to mobilise subjects and put forward a counter-hegemonic project.
Hegemonic political forces and mainstream media are often the first ones to pursue a (radically anti-populist) construction of the crisis, for example, shifting the blame on to the 'populists' themselves.
In other words, it is impossible to effectively study populism without carefully examining anti-populism (Stavrakakis, 2014; Katsambekis, 2016a) . And yet we rarely encounter attempts to define 'anti-populism' in ways that highlight its specificity as a type of discursive articulation and communication strategy. For example, recent studies of populist blame attribution in Greece never thematise anti-populism per se (see Gerodimos 2013; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013) .
Populism and Anti-Populism in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974-2009)
Greece's democratic history has been marked by populist mobilisations but also by periods when anti-populist actors and discourses dominated the public sphere. Indeed, it might make sense to refer to Albert Hirschman's (2002) 'shifting involvements' to better grasp the pendulum movement between periods in which populism is dominant and others in which anti-populist technocratic frames prevail. Initially, democracy was consolidated within the context of a polarised political system in which left-wing (populist/progressive) and right-wing (anti-populist/conservative) forces, represented by PASOK 1 and New Democracy (ND) 2 respectively, defended competing programmes, thus building and disseminating antagonistic collective identities (see Voulgaris, 2001) . The moment of 'crisis' common to both narratives was the dictatorship era (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) , which was recognised by all political forces as a major setback, if not a catastrophe.
At first, the paternalistic (but thoroughly anti-populist) figure of Konstantinos Karamanlis, a right-wing conservative politician, managed to secure for his newly established party, ND, two undisrupted terms in power (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) ). Karamanlis's narrative was one of stability, reconciliation and national unity on the road to EEC accession; and he managed to attract a majority of Greeks, who, after seven years of anomaly, preferred a controlled transition to democracy rather than a radical break (Pappas, 2014: 15-16) . By the late 1970s, however, and throughout the 1980s, the (Spourdalakis, 1988) .
In 1989, PASOK faced defeat, following a massive scandal that allegedly involved its leader. Greece itself entered a period of turbulence, holding three consecutive elections within less than a year, until a government (that of Konstantinos Mitsotakis and ND) could enjoy a fragile majority in parliament. Interestingly, Mitsotakis's government (1990 Mitsotakis's government ( -1993 was probably the first one to be directly registered as 'antipopulist', since it chose to attack PASOK and its leader with reference to their populism, demagoguery, irresponsibility, etc. (Vernardakis, 2011: 3; Voulgaris, 2001: 321), while trying to implement a programme based on labour-and marketderegulation, privatisation and restrictive fiscal policies.
Coping with the reasons for its defeat and internal crisis, PASOK gradually developed a similar anti-populist narrative, which attributed the blame for the party's -as well as for Greece's -problems to 'populism'. This movement from populism to antipopulism had its roots in the interventions of Costas Simitis, a minister in Andreas
Papandreou's administrations who would later become president of PASOK and articulate an alternative (see Gemenis and Nezi, 2015; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013) . It is crucial to stress, however, that ND's opposition to PASOK up until their collaboration was mostly based on moralistic arguments, stressing that 'the memorandum was unnecessarily humiliating' for the Greek nation (Gemenis and Nezi, 2015: 22) . This is another indication that, despite its salience and persistence, the populism/antipopulism divide is not static: it is quite dynamic and malleable, in fact, with political forces having historically occupied positions at both sides of the spectrum. to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates. They were thus not included in the survey (see Stavrakakis et al. 2016: 8-9 Moreover, in an effort to corroborate the existence of a similar divide in the media, we surveyed a series of corpora constructed on the basis of a total of 17,363 articles to which we had access, published in the Greek printed press between 1 June 2014 and 31 May 2015 (for a detailed analysis, see Nikisianis et al., 2016) . After qualitative assessment, 928 among these articles from forty newspapers and magazines were considered relevant (based on references to 'populism,' 'the people' and 'popular sovereignty/will') and were subsequently coded. A maximum effort was made to include, with proportional representation, all the views that have been identified What emerged from this analysis was, once more, a clear division between ostensibly 'anti-populist' and 'pro-populist' media and articles (see Table 1 ). Moreover, this study established the polarisation implicit in pro-populist discourse, but also the demonisation of 'populism' (and the political forces denounced as populist, mainly SYRIZA) by the anti-populist press (where populism is often metaphorically described as a plague, gangrene, cancer, madness, schizophrenia, etc.).
Two main observations follow: (1) the populism/anti-populism divide is clearly reflected in the Greek press; (2) the anti-populist press, which is clearly dominant in quantitative terms (see Table 1 ; see also Nikisianis et al., 2016: 56) , very often uses profoundly bellicose and dismissive language against alleged 'populists', characterising them as threatening, pathogenic or parasitic entities that should be eradicated. This means that it is not only populist actors that privilege antagonistic/polarising confrontation in the public sphere, but also -and sometimes even more strongly -self-proclaimed 'anti-populist' actors, aiming to establish their own divisions and polarities. Source: Nikisianis et al., 2016: 56 After SYRIZA came to power in January 2015, Greece entered a new period of turbulence. When negotiations with the country's European partners reached a deadlock, Tsipras called for a referendum on the 'bail-out' terms proposed to Greece.
The citizens rejected the proposed deal by a majority of 61.31 per cent. The days preceding the referendum were revealing about the depth the populism/anti-populism frontier had acquired on a variety of levels. As noted by Paris Aslanidis and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, it rallied 'the sum of the media establishment behind an openly pro-YES, pro-European campaign, applying immense pressure on the government and subsequently confirming the anti-establishment credentials of the populist government in the eyes of many' (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser, 2016: 9 ).
Yet SYRIZA soon had to retreat and accept a new bail-out agreement. As a result, its populist discourse has gradually toned down, although it has not vanished Published in European Political Science, First Online: 22 January 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0138-3 18 (Katsambekis 2017) . But the anti-populist opposition's discourse seems to have become even more bellicose and polarising. We might have expected to see this narrative disappear or at least become milder in tone after SYRIZA had started to implement a programme that was agreed with Greece's European partners and the situation started to stabilise somewhat. On the contrary, the anti-populist narrative fuelled by mainstream media and traditional/mainstream parties intensified. In fact, it became the cornerstone of the official campaign of the main opposition party, ND, which now declared as its ultimate aim to defeat the populism incarnated in SYRIZA, constantly urging Tsipras to resign (Samaras, 2016; Mitsotakis, 2016a; Mitsotakis, 2016b Our observations here confirm the findings of recent studies that stress anti-populism as one of the main characteristics of mainstream media in Greece (see Lialiouti and Bithymitris, 2013; Mylonas 2014) , while it is also crucial to note the often deeply moralistic character of anti-populist discourse. Needless to say, such pronounced antipopulism is not a peculiar characteristic of the Greek case; in Portugal, for example, it still seems to condition the overall positioning of the country's party system and media, preventing the establishment of significant populist actors in the crisis setting, 6 Such accusations have intensified following the failure of an attempt by the government to regulate the media field (issuing a limited number of television licences) and disagreements with the judiciary on many court decisions affecting its media law and taxation policies.
Published in European Political Science, First Online: 22 January 2018, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0138-3 20 but -crucially -allowing the hegemonic emergence of non-populist alternatives (Salgado, 2018) .
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to shed light on crucial aspects of the antagonistic dialectic between populist and anti-populist discourses in the Greek context.
Presenting a diachronic reading of this antagonistic relationship, we have argued that the populism/anti-populism antithesis may be understood as a salient discursive divide, which becomes 'reactivated' and indeed dominant in conditions of 'failure' or 'dislocation,' like those brought about by the recent economic crisis.
Highlighting this persistent antagonistic relationship is a response to arguments that consider Greece a populist democracy (Pappas, 2014: 36) . In our genealogy, Greece's political system is a terrain on which populist and anti-populist actors construct rival hegemonic projects; at times, the one or the other (temporarily) prevails, while periodic crises can reactivate and further intensify associated polarities. In this sense, looking back at the previous decades of Greece's democratic history, although it is true that most governing and main opposition parties have indeed used confrontational and simplistic discourses, it is very difficult to find a period in which both such parties could be simultaneously regarded as populist.
What also emerges from our analysis is that often it is anti-populist discourses that purport to pre-empt popular mobilisations, by denouncing any opposition as 'populist'.
Indeed, it is only against the dominance of the anti-populist camp in the country's public discourse from the mid-1990s onwards that the recent electoral success of the populist radical left (SYRIZA) can be registered as a (populist) anomaly. This anti- populist orientation has been reflected in recent surveys of the Greek press, contradicting accounts that consider that populism is dominant Greece's public discourse (Pappas 2014; Vamvakas, 2015) .
What is more, the polarisation patterns observed seem to acquire an autonomous dynamic, independent from the policies implemented. Hence, even after SYRIZA's capitulation in July 2015, the populism/anti-populism divide continues to dominate Greek politics, media and academic discourse, constantly constructing polarities with reference to various policy issues (from referendums to constitutional review and from the electoral law to education reform).
Last but not least, what emerges as a crucial issue in the preceding analysis is the very nature of the populism/anti-populism divide. For example, does it constitute a proper cleavage? Following Vít Hloušek (2010) , on the basis of the Greek example we can maintain that it is in discourse that cleavages are (partially) constructed, represented and enacted. Thus, if a 'divide' designates a sharp discursive opposition privileged within a given conjuncture, then a divide which has become salient and hegemonic in public discourse throughout a significant period may be designated as a 'cleavage'.
To the extent that we can observe such a salience in the populism/anti-populism divide throughout Greece's democratic history, and given that it has consistently acquired a key position in signifying political stakes and antagonisms, manifesting on the discursive, the attitudinal (see candidate survey) and the press/media levels (see press analysis), operating along or even penetrating more traditional cleavages (e.g. left/right), one might feel inclined to suggest that the populism/anti-populism discursive frontier may be understood as an emerging cleavage. Building on the salience of a high/low divide in many contexts, Pierre Ostiguy has indeed correlated it This orientation should not be confused with the aforementioned 'populist democracy'
argument. This thesis sees Greek political culture as divided by only 'one single cleavage ostensibly separating "the people" from a host of political and economic elites, whether domestic (such as the old parties, but also young ones like Potami) or foreign (such as the Troika)' (Pappas, 2015 ; see also Vasilopoulou et al., 2013) . And yet, this thesis seems to suffer from two weaknesses: (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013: 13) , which has been long ago discredited by Nicos Mouzelis (1986) . It is only on the basis of such misunderstandings that the cleavage between populism and anti-populism, bottom-up and top-down incorporation, low and high, can be camouflaged as an intra-populist division and Greek political culture as a whole can be designated as 'populist' in toto.
